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Terms of trade, commodity prices  
and inflation dynamics in Chile
1 
Jorge Desormeaux, Pablo García and Claudio Soto 
1.   Introduction 
Commodity prices, terms of trade and real wages play significant roles in shaping the 
inflationary dynamics and persistence of prices in small open economies. The Chilean 
economy is a case in point. A small and very open economy, with a structure of production 
starkly different from the structure of demand, the Chilean economy is subject to the effects 
of significant shocks to commodity prices.  
On the production side, Chile’s endowment of copper is sizeable (both in absolute terms and 
in relation to the world markets), while the rest of the export basket is heavily tilted towards 
exports of raw or processed natural resources. On the demand side, firms and households 
import a significant part of their intermediate inputs (particularly fuels), machinery and 
equipment, and durable goods. The above, coupled with a general policy conducive to free 
trade and with fairly reduced public intervention in the distribution and retailing of goods and 
services, imply that shifts in commodity prices are fed through the economy rather rapidly, 
affecting the allocation of production and demand, as well as changing cost pressures and 
hence, inflationary dynamics. 
This paper presents, in a stylised way, how the Central Bank of Chile has undertaken the 
task of understanding these different channels. Given the existence of nominal rigidities, 
changes in the structure of production and demand will have an impact on the economy’s 
degree of slack, and hence will affect inflationary pressures as well as nominal and real 
wages. Commodity prices, particularly those that affect the local energy prices, will generate 
supply shocks that ripple through the cost structure of the economy and potentially affect 
expectations and the inflationary process over and above its direct impact. These changes in 
relative prices also have a bearing on the real exchange rate, thus potentially dampening the 
effect on the real economy but  itself adding to the cost shifts.  
To assess the proper conduct of policy, given the forward-looking character of monetary 
policy in an inflation targeting framework, as well as the large swings in commodity prices 
that we have witnessed in the past few years, we need to develop a structural view of the 
transmission mechanism of commodity prices to inflation dynamics. Small, semi-structural 
models fall short, requiring the construction and simulation of models that render in richer 
detail the production and demand structure of the economy.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a brief description 
and outline of the structure of production and demand, highlighting the relevant role played 
by mining and other natural resource sectors. The different dynamics of a set of price 
deflators are also shown, particularly the differences between CPI inflation and the annual 
inflation of the GDP deflator. The movements of the real exchange rate and the terms of 
trade are also shown. The third section brings these issues together in a version of the Model 
for Analysis and Simulation (MAS), a DSGE model of the Chilean economy that is now 
routinely used in monetary policy discussions. The fourth section subjects this model to a 
number of shocks, namely oil price and copper price shocks, and the monetary policy 
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response to each of them is analysed, conditional on the degree of credibility of the inflation 
target and the behaviour of the fiscal authority. These exercises help to highlight the 
transmission mechanism of these different shocks to inflation, taking into account the multi-
sectoral nature of the Chilean economy, the role of the real exchange rate, and real wages. 
The fifth section describes recent developments in the inflationary dynamics in Chile. The 
final section presents some tentative conclusions. 
2.   Economic structure, relative prices and inflation 
Table 1 presents a broad outline of the sectoral structure of the Chilean economy, in current 
US dollars for the most recent year for which detailed national accounts data are available 
(2006). Several features are noteworthy. On the production side, the intensity of natural 
resources is readily apparent. Mining, farming and fisheries, for instance, account for 22% of 
total domestic supply, without considering the part of manufacturing that is related to natural 
resources. Imports of mining, farming and fisheries represent only 12% of the total supply 
(net of markups) of these sectors. Conversely, on the demand side, a large fraction of the 
demand faced by these sectors is represented by exports: 62% of total demand, and a 
significant 92% if only exports and final domestic demand are considered. 
From this perspective, manufacturing provides an interesting counterpoint. A large fraction of 
total supply is provided by imports (28%), while only close to one-half (15%) of total demand 
arises from exports. Note that petroleum and chemical products, a sector where local 
production is dwarfed by imports, is included within manufacturing.  
Table 1 
Production and demand structure (US$ million, 2006) 
 
Farming and fishery 
domestic supply  11,880  7,289 intermediate consumption
imports  733 5,004 exports 
markup  2,936  3,257 final domestic demand 
Mining 
domestic supply  43,348  14,255 intermediate consumption
imports  6,964  36,265 exports 
markup  264 56 final domestic demand 
Manufacturing 
domestic supply  57,079  46,179 intermediate consumption
imports  31,787  17,225 exports 
markup  23,912  49,375 final domestic demand 
Other sectors 
domestic supply  133,948  64,896 intermediate consumption
imports  6,757  8,481 exports 
markup  4,515  71,843 final domestic demand 
Total
domestic supply  246,255  132,618 intermediate consumption
imports  46,242  66,975 exports 
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Other, non-traded sectors share the usual characteristic of being mostly supplied and 
demanded locally. Overall though, they represent less than half of total demand and supply 
in the Chilean economy, again underscoring the relevance of primary and tradable sectors, 
mostly linked to natural resources, in the sectoral structure of the economy. 
These structural peculiarities make the one-sector/one-good paradigm particularly limited as 
a representation of the different linkages and sectoral relationships of the Chilean economy 
when modelling inflation and output. The fact that the domestic demand bundle differs from 
the production bundle naturally leads to different – but likely related – price dynamics 
between the production and consumption baskets. Figure 1 presents the annual change in 
the GDP deflator, the private consumption deflator, and the terms of trade. As can be seen, 
the dynamics of the GDP and private consumption deflator differ markedly, due to the large 
terms of trade swings that affect the Chilean economy, and the small representation of 
exportable goods in the consumption basket. 
Figure 1  
GDP and consumption deflators, and terms of trade 
(year-on-year  percentage change) 
 
From 1997 to early 2003 the annual fluctuations in the terms of trade were rather limited (but 
not muted), at around +/- 10%. Over that period, it can be seen that private consumption 
deflator and the GDP deflator fluctuated closely, at or below 5% annually. In contrast, from 
late 2003 onwards, large swings in the terms of trade led to a sharp dissociation of the 
consumption deflator and the GDP deflator. The latter followed the swings in the terms of 
trade, as can be seen in 2006 when the GDP deflator increased 15%, while the terms of 
trade rose 30%, both on an annual basis.  
The private consumption deflator, on the other hand, does not follow the swings of terms of 
trade, and shows what seems like a countercyclical fluctuation: deceleration at a time of 
terms of trade gains, and acceleration as the terms of trade moderate. This pattern is more 
striking from early 2004 onwards, when gains in terms of trade coincided with a deceleration 
in the private consumption deflator. Figure 2 shows that the evolution of the consumption 
















Consumption deflator and CPI inflation 
(year-on-year  percentage change) 
 
The natural link between consumer price inflation and the terms of trade is, of course, the 
real exchange rate. As a commodity exporting economy, the linkage between the real 
exchange rate and the terms of trade has been widely researched and documented.2 This 
link, however, seems to have grown weaker over time, thanks to an increased diversification 
of the export base, and also in response to an enhanced macroeconomic framework, which 
allowed, for instance, the insulation of fiscal policy from copper income shocks, as well as a 
floating exchange rate regime that now bears the brunt of the adjustment to changes in 
external conditions. Thus, although the sensitivity of the overall economy to terms of trade 
shocks is likely to have diminished, this is not necessarily the case with respect to the 
exchange rate, particularly given the huge swings that the prices of copper and oil have 
experienced in the near past.  
Figure 3 shows the path followed over the last decade and a half by the real exchange rate 
and the terms of trade. Although a link is hardly evident, in recent years it appears that 
swings in the real exchange rate are related to changes in terms of trade. This association 
would help to explain the gap between terms of trade changes and domestic consumption 
behaviour. 
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Terms of trade and the real exchange rate 
(index, sample average = 100) 
 
3.   A structural model of the Chilean economy 
In order to understand from a general equilibrium perspective the impact of commodity price 
shocks on different macro variables, we analyse the impulse-response functions to 
commodity price shocks derived from a structural DSGE model for a small open economy. 
The model is a small open economy model in the spirit of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 
(2005), Altig et al (2004), and Smets and Wouters (2003). The economy includes two types 
of households: Ricardian (optimising, forward-looking) households that make choices about 
consumption and borrowing, and set wages; non-Ricardian households that consume all 
their labour income and neither save nor borrow. Production technology uses labour, capital 
and oil. Both prices and wages are sticky (subject to nominal rigidities à la Calvo), with partial 
indexation to past inflation. There are adjustment costs to investment, and the pass-through 
from the exchange rate to the domestic price of imports is imperfect in the short run. The 
model also includes a commodity sector whose production – based on natural resources – is 
completely exported. This sector is meant to characterise the copper sector in the Chilean 
economy. Monetary policy is conducted through a policy rule for the interest rate, while fiscal 
policy is conducted through a structural balance rule. A brief summary of specific aspects of 
the different building blocks of the model is given below (for specific details, see Medina and 
Soto (2007a)). 
3.1   Households 
The domestic economy is inhabited by a continuum of households. A subset of the 
households is Ricardian, with full access to capital markets to smooth consumption. These 
households make consumption and savings decisions that maximise their expected utility. 
The remaining subset is composed of non-Ricardian households without access to capital 
markets. These households consume all of their after-tax disposable income in every period. 














Terms of trade REER 120  BIS Papers No 49
 
 
that consumption evolves slowly over time in response to shocks. Each household consumes 
a basket composed of three types of final goods: domestic goods, foreign goods and oil 
(fuel). The composition of this basket is determined optimally by minimising its cost. 
Each household is also a monopolistic supplier of a differentiated labour service, and sets 
wages in a staggered way. In each period, each household faces a probability of being able 
to re-optimise its nominal wage. A household that is able to re-optimise its wage at t will 
maximise the expected discounted future stream of labour income net of the disutility from its 
work effort, subject to labour demand and to an indexation rule in case it cannot re-optimise 
in the future. This process determines a slow adjustment for nominal wages in response to 
shocks. 
3.2   Investment process 
A representative firm rents capital goods to firms producing intermediate goods, and decides 
how much capital to accumulate each period. The firm may adjust investment each period, 
but changing the flow of investment is costly. This assumption provides a tractable approach 
to modelling investment inertia (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)). The firm 
chooses the level of investment, and the rental price of capital, to maximise its expected 
future profits (rental returns on capital net of the cost of investment), subject to the law of 
motion of the capital stock, which accounts for depreciation and investment adjustment 
costs.  
3.3   Domestic production 
Domestic goods are produced by firms with monopoly power over particular varieties of 
these goods. These firms maximise profits by choosing the price of their differentiated good 
subject to the demand they face, and the available technology. The technology to produce a 
particular good is a function that combines capital, labour and oil. Since oil is an imported 
intermediate good, it does not add to the value added in production. The value added is 
given by a Cobb-Douglas function with capital and labour. The technology for gross output 
combines value added and oil with an elasticity of substitution between them that is less than 
one. 
Price setting is assumed to follow a Calvo-type structure. In every period, the probability that 
a firm is able to adjust its price is fixed, and is the same for all firms, independent of their 
history. If a firm does not receive a signal, it indexes its price following a simple rule that 
weights past inflation and the inflation target set by the central bank. Given this pricing 
structure, the behaviour of inflation is captured by a new-Keynesian Philips curve with 
indexation. In its log-linear form, inflation depends on last period’s inflation, expected inflation 
in the next period, and marginal costs.  
We also assume that a single firm produces a homogeneous commodity good that is 
completely exported abroad, e.g. copper. Production requires no labour or capital. 
Production in this sector can be interpreted as the exogenous evolution of an endowment of 
natural resources. The price of this commodity is determined in the world market. 
3.4   Fiscal and monetary policies 
In the baseline case, the model assumes that the government follows a structural balance 
fiscal rule (see Medina and Soto (2006b)). The purpose of this fiscal rule is to avoid 
excessive fluctuations in government expenditure stemming from transitory movements in 
fiscal revenues. Government expenditure can increase if the long-run price of copper rises, 
or if potential output growth increases. In the case of a transitory rise in fiscal revenues from 
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saved. The same happens with extra revenues collected from a transitory expansion in 
output beyond potential. 
Monetary policy is characterised as a simple feedback rule for the real interest rate. We 
assume that the Central Bank responds to contemporaneous deviations of core inflation from 
the target of 3% and also to deviations of output from its trend. In the model, core inflation 
corresponds to a linear combination of the inflation of domestic goods and the inflation of 
imported goods, excluding oil. While it is true that the target for the Central Bank is defined in 
terms of headline CPI inflation, its intermediate objective is to keep expected inflation on 
target. In the case of open economy DSGE models, it has been shown that expected inflation 
rules tend to render the model undetermined (see Batini and Pearlman (2002)). In order to 
avoid such a problem, the model assumes that the Central Bank reacts to contemporaneous 
deviations of trend inflation – proxied by core inflation – from target. 
4.   Macro responses to commodity price shocks 
Oil price shock under perfect credibility  
We analyse first the responses to an oil price shock under perfect credibility regarding the 
target of the monetary policy. The shock corresponds to an increase of 100% in the real price 
of oil (nominal price of oil in US$ deflated by the international price level).  
Figure 4  
Quarterly impulse response to an oil price shock  
under perfect credibility 
(year-on-year percentage change from steady-state) 
 
Results are depicted in Figure 4. Since oil is part of the consumption basket and thus enters 
directly into the measure of the price level relevant for consumption, an oil price shock 
generates an immediate increase in CPI inflation. It also affects inflation indirectly through its 
impact on marginal cost faced by domestic firms. Since prices are sticky, this increase in 
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marginal cost is not completely transferred to prices, and markups shrink. This leads to a 
contraction in activity of almost 2% within a year of the shock. 
Notice that the contraction in activity implies a reduction in labour demand, which in turn 
requires an adjustment in real wages. This variable actually falls in response to the shock 
and remains below trend for several quarters, even after inflation has converged back to 
target after a year.  
The monetary policy response to the shock is initially an increase in the policy rate, followed 
after two quarters is by a rate reduction below the neutral rate. The muted increase in the 
policy rate despite the relatively large increase in CPI inflation is due to the fact that the 
shock is transitory and that the policy is credible. The subsequent lowering of the policy rate 
is required in order boost demand so that output returns back to trend. 
Copper price shock under alternative fiscal policies  
As mentioned above, the baseline case scenario considers a fiscal policy that follows a 
structural rule, which is intended to replicate the policy rule being followed by the Chilean 
government since 2001. We use the model to ask ourselves what would have happened in 
the economy if, instead of following this rule, the government had followed a procyclical 
pattern, increasing expenditures one to one with a copper price shock. 
Figure 5 
Quarterly impulse response to a copper price shock  
under alternative fiscal policies 
(year-on-year percentage change from steady-state) 
 
The results of this exercise are reported in Figure 5. The most striking difference in the 
responses of the main macro variables to the copper price shock under alternative fiscal 
policies is regarding inflation. When the government raises its expenditure in response to the 
windfall gains from copper, there is a large increase in demand, and output rises. As a result, 
inflation increases and the real exchange rate appreciates significantly.  
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When the government follows the structural rule, instead, most of the windfall gain is saved. 
The currency appreciates since the net foreign asset position of the country improves. The 
appreciation of the currency leads to a fall in the inflation of imported goods, and total CPI 
also decreases. 
This sharp contrast in the response of inflation to the copper price shock leads to a very 
muted monetary policy reaction. In the first case, when the government follows a highly 
expansionary fiscal policy, monetary policy needs to be tightened strongly. In contrast, if the 
government follows the structural rule, the monetary policy does not need to respond. 
Oil price shock under imperfect credibility  
Now we turn to the case of imperfect credibility regarding the objective of monetary policy. In 
order to analyse this case, we assume that private agents assign certain probability that the 
Central Bank will transitorily deviate from its target. More precisely, since the oil price shock 
leads to a temporary increase in inflation, we assume that private agents believe that part of 
this increase is due to a relaxation of the target by the monetary authority, while in fact it is 
not.
3 
When the monetary authority lacks credibility, an oil price shock leads to a much larger 
increase in inflation. Inflation not only rises by more when credibility is imperfect, it is also 
much more persistent in response to the shock. 
Figure 6  
Quarterly impulse response to an oil price shock  
under perfect and imperfect credibility 







































Note that, initially, output may grow above trend during some quarters. This is due to the fact 
that the real interest rate (not shown) falls during the first quarters after the shock, because 
the nominal interest rate has not increased as much as necessary to compensate for the 
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surge in inflation. After a few quarters, the monetary authority tightens even further, and 
succeeds in inducing an increase in the ex-ante real interest rate above the neutral rate. This 
creates a contraction in activity that is much stronger than in the case of perfect credibility. 
This is the only way the Central Bank can bring expectations back in line with the target in 
order to reduce inflation. In sum, if the monetary authority lacks credibility it will face a more 
serious trade-off between stabilising output and inflation. As a result, the sacrifice ratio will 
also be larger. 
5.   Recent inflation trends in Chile 
The inflation process in Chile has shown dramatic changes in the past year and a half, 
thanks to significant swings in the international prices of food and energy, and their various 
implications on the price setting behaviour of domestic agents. By mid-2007, inflation 
surprises in energy and foods showed that the pass-through of international prices to local 
prices was proceeding quickly, and in August 2007 annual inflation breached the high end of 
the Central Bank’s tolerance range (4%) and kept increasing, reaching close to 8% by year-
end. This process was further exacerbated by the significant impact of local weather 
conditions (ice storms in springtime) on the prices of perishable foods, which contributed to a 
significant hike in non-core inflation. Also, the regulatory environment implied that the higher 
costs of energy generation, resulting from an increase in the likelihood of a drought in 2008, 
and hence of a lower contribution of hydroelectric power, along with higher energy prices and 
the scarcity of imported gas, led to significant increases in residential tariffs.  
Figure 7  
Incidence in headline inflation 
 
Over this period (late 2007), however, the broadly held view was that the inflation spike was 
merely a supply side shock derived from higher international prices and specific domestic 
factors, but where no generalised inflation pressures were evident. The bulk of the argument 
regarding this point relied on the stability of inflation expectations up to that point. Although 
one-year-ahead expectations had showed a small increase, they nevertheless implied a very 
quick convergence to the target over 2008 and early 2009. Moreover, with the exception of 
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remarkably resilient to the sharp spike in headline inflation. The official forecast for inflation 
presented in the Inflation report of early 2008 considered that by the end of that year inflation 
would have fallen to slightly below 5%.  
Over the first quarter of 2008, the inflation prospects became more uncertain. On the one 
hand, the incoming data on headline inflation was somewhat reassuring, in that no evidence 
was available of further large surprises on that front and data on wages and indexed prices 
did not show an abnormally large response to the higher inflation of 2007, as a propagation 
on core components of inflation was expected to occur anyway. The significant appreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate, due to the swings in currency markets over the initial period of 
the global financial crisis in late 2007 and early 2008, indicated lower inflationary pressures 
in the medium run. On the other hand, inflation expectations remained stubbornly sticky at 
levels higher than the official forecasts, and breakeven inflation rates kept on creeping 
upwards. In this complex macroeconomic environment, the Board of the Central Bank held 
the policy rate constant and actually initiated a programme of reserve accumulation in April 
2008 to increase the insurance against a further deterioration of the global financial 
environment. The monetary policy report of May 2008 presented forecasts for inflation that 
still considered a somewhat rapid convergence to the target and thus the bias on the policy 
stance was starkly neutral.  
Figure 8 
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Between April and September the inflation genie got out of the bottle, quickly showing that 
the inflation forecast had become obsolete. Headline inflation exceeded 9% in June. 
Although this period also coincided with the significant spike in fuel prices globally, 
propagation of inflation pressures to core components became increasingly visible: our non-
fuel non-energy CPI inflation crept up over 5% and expected inflation shot through the roof, 
to levels that implied clearly non-convergence to the 3% target over a two-year horizon. 
Monetary policy moved accordingly to a tighter stance, hiking the policy rate by 50 basis 
points in June, July, August and September, to 8.25%. The likelihood of double-digit inflation 
increased significantly. In the Monetary Policy Report presented on 11 September 2008, the 
Board communicated that a tough stance had to be taken to fight the inflationary tendencies, 
announcing that further monetary policy rate hikes were in the pipeline, over and above what 
the market was expecting at the time. The basis of this argument was that global conditions 
would not help much in the disinflation process and that local growth was actually surprising 126  BIS Papers No 49
 
 
us on the upside. Expected GDP growth for 2008 was in the 4.5–5.0% range, and oil price 
futures pointed to steady prices of around $109 per barrel. Lehmann Brothers collapsed the 
following week. 
Figure 9  



































































Since October 2008, this environment changed yet again in dramatic fashion. Commodity 
prices collapsed, emerging market exchange rates depreciated markedly, and the impact of 
the global financial crisis was felt acutely in the domestic front. In our two most recent 
Monetary Policy Reports (January and May 2009), the Central Bank acknowledged that 
since the last quarter of 2008 the economy had observed a much weaker performance than 
expected, weakening the labour market and widening the output gap, and that as a result we 
now expected the slack of the economy to persist well into 2010. This led the Central Bank in 
January 2009 to initiate a policy-easing cycle without precedent in our history. Policy rates 
were cut by 775 basis points, from 8.25% in January 2009 to 0.50% in July of the same year. 
Thanks to the resilience of our financial system, the markets have accommodated a large 
depreciation of the exchange rate with actually lower break-even inflation rates going 
forward, despite the sharp easing of policy rates in the very short term. Just as the previous 
increase in international prices fed into local fuel prices during the first half of 2008, the 
dramatic fall in energy prices has been quickly transferred to domestic prices, leading to 
large negative headline inflation readings in recent months. We expect negative annual 
inflation rates again, at the end of the third quarter and the beginning of the fourth quarter of 
2009. Our May 2009 Monetary Policy Report projects that inflation will reach 0.6% by year-
end, and will gradually converge back to 3% within our two-year policy horizon.  
Conclusions 
The Chilean economy is a small and very open economy, with a structure of production that 
is starkly different from the structure of its demand, and regularly experiences significant 
commodity price shocks. Commodity prices, terms of trade and real wages play significant 
roles in shaping the inflationary dynamics and persistence of prices in Chile. In particular, 
given the competitive nature of its retail sector, commodity prices are fed through the 
economy rather rapidly, affecting the allocation of production and demand and the dynamics 
of inflation.  
To describe adequately the different channels through which commodity prices affect the 
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in this paper we present the results of a stylised DSGE model of the Chilean economy. The 
model is subjected to two types of commodity price shocks to highlight the transmission 
mechanism to inflation, taking into account the characteristics of the Chilean economy, in 
particular the role played by the fiscal policy rule in smoothing copper price shocks, and 
credibility regarding monetary policy.  
An oil price shock generates a direct increase in CPI inflation, and an indirect effect through 
its impact on the marginal cost faced by domestic firms. Since prices are sticky, this increase 
in marginal cost is not completely transferred to prices, and markups shrink. This leads to a 
contraction in activity of almost 2% within a year of the shock. The monetary policy response 
to the shock is initially a small increase in the policy rate, which is followed by a small 
reduction below the neutral rate. The muted reaction of the policy rate, despite the relatively 
large increase in CPI inflation, is due to the fact that the shock is transitory and that policy is 
credible. We show that if monetary policy lacks credibility then an oil price shock leads to a 
much larger and persistent increase in inflation. In this context, the monetary authority needs 
to tighten further, which creates a contraction in activity that is much stronger than in the 
case of perfect credibility. 
We also analyse the impact of a copper price shock in the context of a fiscal policy that 
follows a procyclical pattern, where fiscal expenditures increase one to one with terms of 
trade gains. The results are contrasted with those obtained assuming a fiscal policy that 
follows a structural balance rule, which intends to replicate the policy rule that Chile has 
followed since 2001. The most important difference between the two scenarios analysed is 
the impact on inflation. When the government raises its expenditure in response to the 
windfall gains from copper, there is a large increase in demand, and output rises. As a result, 
inflation increases and the real exchange rate appreciates. When the government follows the 
structural balance rule, instead, most of the windfall gain is saved, and there is only a mild 
increase in inflation. The monetary policy reaction is different in the two cases. In the first 
case, when the government follows a procyclical fiscal policy, monetary policy needs to be 
tightened strongly. When the government follows the structural balance rule, on the other 
hand, monetary policy does not need to respond. 
In sum, a procyclical fiscal policy and imperfect credibility of monetary policy significantly 
increase the real cost of stabilising inflation in response to commodity price shocks. 
These exercises help us understand some recent developments of the inflationary dynamics 
in Chile, in particular the upsurge in inflation that developed between 2007 and the third 
quarter of 2008, the rapid disinflation that followed thereafter, and the policy response to it. 
During 2007, supply shocks derived from higher international prices of energy and food, 
together with specific domestic factors, led to an acceleration of domestic inflation. Despite 
this, both the monetary authority and the market believed that this spike in inflation did not 
warrant a strong reaction of monetary policy, as a rapid convergence to the target was 
forecast. However, between April and October, CPI inflation rapidly accelerated, reaching a 
peak of 9.9% on an annual basis in October 2008, partly as a result of yet another spike in 
international fuel prices, but also due to the propagation of past inflationary shocks towards 
core components of inflation. 
Expected inflation increased to levels that were no longer consistent with a convergence 
toward 3% within a two-year horizon. As a result, monetary policy initiated a rapid tightening 
cycle, and the monetary authority announced, in its September Monetary Policy Report, that 
further rate increases were to come, as global conditions, though weaker, were not sufficient 
to cool the economy and guarantee the required disinflation. 
This view would start to change in dramatic fashion only a week later, as the world economy 
plunged into a recession following the fall of Lehman Brothers. Just as the increases in 
international prices fed into local fuel prices at a rapid pace during the first half of 2008, the 
dramatic drop in energy and food prices since the last quarter of 2008 was quickly 
transferred to domestic prices, leading to a rapid disinflation process. As a result, monetary 128  BIS Papers No 49
 
 
policy initiated an aggressive easing cycle in June 2009, which reduced policy rates from 
8.25% in January 2009 to 0.50% in July 2009.  
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